I analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of R&D ventures engaged in a multiple-stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty. After solving in closedform for the case of a two-stage race in continuous-time, I show that a firm's risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead in the race. Compared to the case where competing firms collude, R&D competition (i) erodes the option value to mothball a project (ii) reduces the completion time and the failure rate of R&D and (iii) causes higher and more volatile in risk premia. Numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis point higher and up to three times more volatile than in a collusive industry.
Introduction
Selecting the proper discount rate is a daunting task in every capital budgeting process.
The complexity of R&D investment projects makes this task particularly challenging. R&D investments are characterized by multiple sources of uncertainty, and produce cash flows only after potentially many and unpredictable stages of research. The progress towards completion usually requires a sequence of successful investments, each of which opens the possibility to undertake the next phase of research. Myers and Howe (1997) and Berk, Green, and Naik (2003) provide qualitative and quantitative guidance on how to select the proper cost of capital for a multi-stage R&D project in the absence of competitive pressures. A key feature of R&D investments, however, is that they rarely occur in a competitive vacuum. The competitive pressure under which R&D takes place makes a compelling case for a systematic analysis of the effect of competition on the determination of the cost of capital of firms engaged in R&D activity. When and how do we need to account for competition in evaluating an R&D venture? How do risk premia relate to the relative position of firms in the development process and to their strategic investment decisions? Is intensity of rivalry associated with the riskiness of a venture? Does the industry structure in which R&D investments take place affect the cost of capital of R&D firms?
In this paper, I address these questions by modeling the investment process of R&D ventures engaged in a multi-stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty. In a patent race, the investment decisions of a firm affect, and are affected by, decisions of its opponents. I first analyze the capital budgeting process of an R&D firm engaged in a patent race and characterize the equilibrium value and risk premia demanded by an ownership claim in such venture. I then compare the results obtained in the competitive case to the collusive case in which investment efforts of R&D ventures are coordinated by a monopolist. For the case of a two-stage patent race, I am able to derive closed-form expressions for the value and risk premia of competing ventures. For more complex races, I solve the model numerically.
As in Berk, Green, and Naik (2003) , I take as exogenous the potential cash flows, or market profit, that a firm will generate upon completion and then evaluate these cash flows and the R&D venture simultaneously in a dynamic game describing the strategic capital budgeting process. Deriving the value of the "underlying security" endogenously rather than specifying it exogenously, allows one to focus on the relative systematic risk of R&D.
I show that the relative position during a race, although purely idiosyncratic, is a crucial determinant of risk premia. This happens since the optimal investment strategies of rival firms in equilibrium depend on systematic risk and thus affect the discount rate used to evaluate projects. Contrary to the case of a single firm, risk premia of R&D ventures competing in a patent race are not monotonic in the underlying firm's profitability. When a firm successfully overcomes an R&D stage, the "leverage" of its investment option decreases while the "effective leverage" of the preempted firm increases. As a consequence, the risk premium of the venture that successfully preempts decreases while the risk premium of the preempted opponent increases. Competition and the relative position during a race alter the value and properties of such investment options and have dramatic implications for the cost of capital of a venture during a patent race. While the presence of a rival represents a "threat" of preemption, on the other hand, a rival also induces a venture to forego earlier its option to mothball. The model shows that when this option is not valuable, i.e. when market conditions are sufficiently good, competition increases the risk premia of a firm leading the race. When market conditions are poor, competition decreases the leader's risk premia. This implies that, when estimating the cost of capital of an R&D firm engaged in a patent race, a venture facing a "close" rival is not always riskier than a venture facing a more distant rival.
The comparison of the results obtained in a competitive environment with the ones derived assuming perfect collusion between R&D units reveals that competition causes substantial rent dissipation, excess R&D spending and higher and more volatile risk premia.
On the other side, competition dramatically reduces the completion time and the failure rate of research within the industry. Numerical calibrations show that the cost of capital in the competitive industry can be up to 500 annual basis point higher and up to three times more volatile than the cost of capital in the collusive industry. This paper is related to two major strands of research in economics and finance. In economics, there is a rich literature on patent races. 1 My model of a race is closest to Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Harris and Vickers (1985) in that I combine strategic interactions between players and technical uncertainty. Unlike these models however, my focus is not on optimal patent policies or on the speed and diffusion of innovation, but on valuation and the dynamics of risk premia. By explicitly modelling the evolution of potential cash flows generated upon completion, I am able to assess the impact of preemption on value and quantify the interaction among the different sources of risk (technical, systematic and preemption driven) in the determination of the overall riskiness of the venture.
The second strand of literature in which my model naturally fits is the real option approach to capital budgeting (see the books by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1996) for a good survey of this literature). Recently, there have been increasing efforts to combine strategic issues and real options by modelling competition both in reduced and in structural form (see Grenadier (2000) and Brennan and Trigeorgis (1999) for a survey of this literature). Reduced-form models treat competition as an exogenous factor altering either the drift of the present value of the completed project, or the stochastic evolution of the underlying cash flows. 2 In this paper, I use instead a structural game-theoretic approach which allows me to explicitly isolate the effect of strategic interactions on risk premia within a race. 3 In a recent paper, Miltersen and Schwartz (2003) also use a structural model to study R&D investments with competitive interactions. Their focus however is on the effect of R&D competition on production and prices and not on the cost of capital, as it is in this paper. Using a similar framework as Miltersen and Schwartz (2003) , Meng (2003) develops a continuous-time duopoly patent race and analyzes firms' beta and return volatilities as well as policy implication of R&D competition. Methodologically, my approach differs substantially from Miltersen and Schwartz (2003) and Meng (2003) in that I do not take as exogenous the process for expected investment costs. Although appealing for tractability reasons, assuming an exogenous expected cost to solve for the optimal investment strategy 1 See, for example, Loury (1980) , Lee and Wilde (1980) , Reinganum (1981) , Reinganum (1982) , Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, and Tirole (1983) , Harris and Vickers (1985) , Harris and Vickers (1987) , Judd (1985) and Grossman and Shapiro (1987) .
2 See Trigeorgis (1990) , Schwartz and Moon (2000) , Childs and Triantis (1999) , Grenadier and Weiss (1997) and Berk, Green, and Naik (2003) .
3 A game-theoretic approach is also followed by Smit and Trigeorgis (1993) and Grenadier (2002) to model product market competition with complete information and by Lambrecht (1999) and Grenadier (1999) in an incomplete information setting. None of these paper focus on the dynamics of risk premia.
does not guarantee that the resulting investment cost under the optimal policy has the functional form originally conjectured, which may lead to potential dynamic inconsistency.
By taking as exogenous the technology for advancing, I preserve dynamic consistency and can also solve in closed-form for the value, investment strategy and risk premia in a twostage race.
The rest of this article is arranged as follows. In Section 2, I formalize the model used to describe investment decisions of firms engaged in a patent race and characterize their value, optimal investment strategies and the risk premia earned by a claim on a competing R&D venture. Section 3 derives a closed-form solution for value and risk premia in a two-stage game that can be used to discuss some of the properties of the general solution. In Section 4, I solve the model numerically and analyze the dynamics of risk premia within a race as well as across different industry structures. Section 5 compares the results obtained in the competitive case to the case in which firms are allowed to collude. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs of the main propositions are collected in Appendix A. Appendix B contains a description of the algorithm used in the numerical computations and Appendix C contains the tables and figures used in the numerical analysis.
The Patent Race Model
In this section I develop a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the capital budgeting process of R&D ventures engaged in a patent race and characterize their equilibrium values and investment strategies.
Dynamics of the R&D Game
Let us consider two all-equity financed, single-project firms, A and B, competing in the development of a project that requires N phases to be completed. 4 The only non-negative cash flow is received by the winning firm at the end of the race. To focus on the investment problem, I look at this project in isolation, as if it were the only asset on the firm's balance sheet. I assume that firms have or can raise resources to undertake investments when it is optimal to do so. The first firm to complete the project will gain a perfect patent protection on the product developed, and will assume a monopoly position in the product market.
At every point in time before completion, the two firms must decide simultaneously whether to keep working on the project in the attempt to overcome the next hurdle, or to mothball. In making their decisions on whether to undertake a phase of the investment or not, the firms consider: (i) their position in the investment race, i.e., the number of stages completed, and (ii) a signal in the form of potential cash flow or profit, δ, generated by the completed project.
Potential Cash Flows
I model the potential cash flow δ as a Geometric Brownian Motion under the probability
where dW δ t represents the instantaneous increments of a standard Brownian Motion. The signal δ(t) is common knowledge at time t. Ideally, δ(t) would be the actual cash flow if the firm were able to commercialize its finished product at time t. Even though the firms involved in the race are evidently not generating cash flows before completion, I will still refer to δ as the "cash flow" process. This process can also be interpreted as an indicator of general economic conditions for the industry in which the two firms compete.
Investment Costs
When a firm decides to continue with the current research phase, it must bear an instantaneous investment cost I(t)dt where I(t) = a + bδ(t). The investment cost I(t) represents the salary to be paid to research scientists and development engineers as well as the cost of equipment, market research, etc. The variable component of the investment cost, bδ(t), reflects both the influence of macroeconomic factors such as inflation and wage rates and the possible existence of incentive contracts linking employee compensation to forecasted profitability of the project. The fixed component, a, simply captures those portions of the incurred investment cost that are not dependent on δ.
Technical Uncertainty
Once a decision to invest is undertaken by firm i = A, B, the probability it will be successful in the next dt instants is π i dt with π i common knowledge. 5 For simplicity, I assume that the probability of overcoming a hurdle is independent of the particular stage of the investment an that technical uncertainty is independent of cash flow uncertainty.
Let n(t) be the random variable representing the number of stages completed by firm A at time t and m(t) be the analogous variable for firm B. The state of the technology race at time t is summarized by (n(t), m(t)). Every firm knows the number of stages completed by the opponent. Since the game is played in continuous time, the probability of having the two firms successfully completing a stage contemporaneously is of order dt 2 and I will therefore treat it as negligible. I indicate by u i (t) ∈ {0, 1} the binary decision (wait/invest) that firm i faces at time t.
The evolution of the state variable (n(t), m(t)) depends on (i) the strategy simultaneously played by the firms and (ii) the probability of overcoming a hurdle once investment is undertaken. Excluding terms of order dt 2 , the dynamics of (n(t), m(t)) are as follows 
Valuation of Cash Flows
To evaluate a stream of random future cash flows, I assume the existence of a pricing kernel z(t) evolving according to the following Geometric Brownian Motion:
where r is the (constant) riskless interest rate and dW z t is the increment of a Standard Brownian Motion under the probability measure P . The systematic risk of an uncertain 5 The probability of succeeding is unaffected by the investment decision, if we exclude the fact that it is zero if no investment is made. In other words, I am modelling a linear effort function, with the natural "bang-bang" decisions represented by "Investing" and "Waiting". This distinguishes my model from many models in the patent race literature (see Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Harris and Vickers (1987) for examples).
stream of cash flows is measured by taking covariances with the pricing kernel. The correlation of the innovation process for the cash flow and for the pricing kernel is given by corr(dW δ t , dW z t ) = ρ. An exogenously specified pricing kernel rules out the possibility that firms' investment decisions may alter the production function, and hence the state-prices, in the economy.
The valuation of cash flows follows a standard argument (see Duffie (1996) ). The evolution of the cash flow process δ under the risk-neutral measure Q is given by 6
where λ = ρσ δ σ z and, assuming the condition of Girsanov's theorem are satisfied, d W δ t is a Standard Brownian Motion under Q.
We are now ready to characterize the value and investment strategy of a competitive R&D venture.
Firm Value and Investment Strategies
Let V i (δ(t), n(t), m(t)) be the value of firm i = A, B at time t when A has completed n(t) stages and B has completed m(t) stages. The value of each firm i = A, B before completion of the project is
where T is an arbitrary future time and u i (t) ∈ {0, 1} is the binary decision (wait/invest) that firm i undertakes at time t. For simplicity, in what follows, I will ignore the time index t and the firm index i unless necessary.
At the end of the race, there are no strategic issues involved in the valuation process.
Due to the winner-take-all provision, the value of the loser is zero. 7 We summarize this in the following proposition.
6 Since I assume the existence of a pricing kernel, the existence of a risk-neutral measure Q is guaranteed. 7 The winner-take-all provision can be thought of as a case of infinite patent protection.
Proposition 1 (Firms Value at Completion) If firm A completes the project first, then
To guarantee that the project has finite value, I assume that r > µ − λ. The value before completion is summarized in the following proposition 
where A is the Dyinkin operator for the state variable δ.
Under some regularity conditions 9 on V A and V
B
, the investment strategies (u * A , u * B ) that solves the above system can be described by a pair of thresholds δ * A (n, m) and δ * B (n, m) such that
The HJB system hence reduces to a recursive system of ordinary differential equation that can be solved by working backwards from the boundary conditions for V 
8 Notice that the condition V i (N, N, δ), i = A, B is not specified, since the state (N, N ) cannot be reached. 9 It is necessary that a single crossing property holds at the investment threshold.
In the remainder of the paper, I will consider symmetric races only, i.e., races in which the competing firms have identical cost structure (a, b) and identical research skills (π A = π B = π). 10 I denote by V (δ, n, m) the value of firm A when A has completed n stages and B has completed m stages, i.e. V (δ, n, m) ≡ V A (δ, n, m). The corresponding value of firm B in state (n, m) is hence obtained by simply exchanging the indexes n and m, i.e.
In Appendix A, I show that the value of a firm engaged in a race is increasing in the number of phases completed and decreasing in the number of phases completed by the opponent (Proposition A.1). A useful property of the game is that, under some conditions (specified in Proposition A.2 in Appendix A), the strategies played by the competing firms are of the threshold type, i.e., every investment rule can be described uniquely in any given state (n, m) by a level of cash flow δ * (n,m) such that mothballing occurs for δ < δ * (n,m) and investment occurs for δ ≥ δ * (n,m) . Finally, for the class of threshold investment strategies, I show that a firm that leads the race (i.e., it has completed more phases than its rival), exercises its next development option at a lower threshold than the rival (see Proposition A.3 in Appendix A). In other words, the leader in a race is more eager to invest than the follower. 12
Risk Premia
The risk premium Λ(n, m) in stage (n, m) is defined as the instantaneous excess expected return over the risk free rate, i.e.
Once the optimal strategy (u * A , u * B ) is played, the "drift" E Q [dV ]/V , under the riskneutral probability measure Q is, by construction, the risk free rate r. Following standard 10 The results can be easily extended to non-symmetric races. 11 In other words, if the race is symmetric, the value of Firm B when A has completed n stages and B has completed m stages is equivalent to the value of Firm A in the symmetric situation in which A has completed m stages and B has completed n stages.
12 Grossman and Shapiro (1987) find an analogous property. In their paper, they show that the leader in a race "works harder" than the follower. In a recent paper, Doraszelski (2003) finds that, under the assumption that firms learn and forget during the race, it is generally the follower-not the leader-that works harder.
arguments, we obtain that the risk premium for a competing venture is given by
Equation (10) shows that the risk premium is λ times the elasticity of the firm value with respect to the underlying cash flow. As in Berk, Green, and Naik (2003)), under the assumed pricing kernel (3), λ represents the risk premium of the completed project as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3 The risk premium of the completed project is constant and equal to λ.
The above proposition provides a useful benchmark to analyze whether and to what extent the "distance" from completion, technical uncertainty and the presence of a rival can affect risk premia.
Analytical Solution for a Two-Stage Game
The system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (6)- (7) I solve the system described in (6)- (7) 
Proposition 4 The value
where
The constant coefficients
The analytical expression for the value just derived, together with equation (10) can be used to determine the risk premia in the race, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The risk premium
where λ is the risk premium for the completed project derived in Proposition 3. The value of a competing firm is increasing in the number of stages completed and decreasing in the number of stages completed by the opponent. Panel B reports also the optimal investment threshold in all the possible scenarios. Solving for these thresholds as described in Appendix A gives δ * (1,0) < δ * (1,1) < δ * (0,1) < δ * (0,0) which is consistent with the "eagerness of the leader" property: the closer a firm is to completion, the earlier it invests. 14 The analysis of risk premia reveals that risk premia demanded by an R&D venture competing for a patent are strongly affected by the equilibrium investment strategies followed by both competing firms. Figure 1 illustrates a few interesting properties of risk premia.
First, contrary to the case of a single firm, risk premia in a patent race are not monotonic in the underlying cash flows, as the values of Λ(1, 0) (leader) and Λ(0, 1) (follower) clearly
show. The risk premium of the follower increases when the leader invests. Similarly, the risk premium of the leading firms decreases when it invests while the opponent remains idle.
Second, unlike the case of a single firm, risk premia are not always constant when a firm moth-balls, as the evolution of the risk premia Λ(0, 1) of a preempted firm shows. Third, for high enough cash flows, risk premia are decreasing, consistent with the intuition that higher underlying cash flow corresponds to a less leveraged option. Fourth, the risk premia demanded by the leader is uniformly lower than the risk premia demanded by the follower.
Fifth, for every level of underlying cash flow δ a firm with a closer rival is riskier than a firm with a distant rival (compare, for example Λ(1, 0) vs. Λ(1, 1)). The last two properties are however a consequence of the fact that the race is only a two-stage race. For a game with more stages, there is no guarantee that this result will hold as the numerical calibration of the next section will show. Note finally that the level of risk premia documented in this 13 The results are derived by using the following parameter values: N = 2, a = 1, b = 0.1, π = .2, µ = .10, σ δ = .30 r = .04, λ = .08. With these parameters, β = 1.26066, ζ = −2.86148, γ 1 = −2.04827 and γ2 = 2.60382.
14 Note that, even if not evident from the figure, the value of firm A in state (0,1) (see the line labelled "V A (0, 1)" in Figure 1 ) is not convex for values of δ ∈ (δ * (1,0) , δ * (0,1) ). This is consistent with the findings in Smets (1991) for a case of a duopolistic industry (see also Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , p. 311).
example is always larger than the risk premium λ of the underlying cash flows, suggesting that a valuable option to invest/mothball, results in a risk premium in excess to the risk premium of the completed project.
Numerical Calibration of the Model
Since the complexity of the model does not allow any further analytical characterization, in this section I calibrate the model to a more realistic setting with more than two stages and solve numerically for the equilibrium value, investment strategies and risk premia. 
Parameter Values
I calibrate the model to quarterly data, i.e. one period corresponds to three months. 15 The parameters used in the numerical analysis are described in Table I. [Insert Table I here] I consider an R&D project that requires N = 5 phases to be completed. I assume a fixed cost a = 1 per period and a variable cost b = .1 per period. The probability of technical success is assumed equal to 10% for both players. This refers to the chance of being successful in a quarter if investment is undertaken. The potential cash flow process or profitability, δ, grows at an average of 3% per annum with an annual standard deviation of 30%. I select the standard deviation, σ z , of the pricing kernel and the correlation, ρ, between the pricing 15 In such a period it is relatively unlikely that two research ventures are both successful in the research process.
kernel's innovations and those of the cash flow process in order to obtain a risk premium λ = 2.25% per annum. This is also the risk premium demanded by the completed project as shown in Proposition 3. Since the real risk free rate is assumed to be 5% per annum, this implies an expected return of 7.25%per annum for the completed project. 16 Robustness of all the results reported in the remainder of the paper have been extensively checked against different sets of parameters. The patterns of risk premia is consistent with what observed in the analytical solution for a two-stage game in Section 3. Risk premia as a function of cash flows follow two clearly distinct patterns depending on whether a R&D firm is leading or lagging the race. In the "leading" stages (n > 2) risk premia are monotonically decreasing in the level of cash flow.
Risk Premia, Technical Progress and Preemption
A higher δ makes active development more likely thus reducing the effective leverage and risk premium of the investment option. These findings are consistent with the results in Berk, Green, and Naik (2003) for the case of a single monopoly firm. In the "lagging" stages (n < 2), however, risk premia are no longer monotonic in the cash flow but can increase as cash flows improve. This happens when the opponent preempts by exercising its investment option at a lower threshold.
Panel A in Figure 3 , illustrates the effect of preemption by considering explicitly the risk premia of a firm which successfully completed three stages (leader), facing a firm which completed only one stage (follower). The solid line refers to the leader risk premia and the dashed-dotted line to the follower's. The figures also indicates the firms' optimal investment 16 With these parameter values, the expected completion time for a firm that is forced to always invest is 5/.1 = 50 quarters or 12.5 years which is consistent, for example, with the mean development time in the pharmaceutical sector. Using Monte Carlo techniques to simulate histories of cash flow δ as described in section 5, the expected cost to completion for a firm that is forced to always invest is 88.66. triggers δ * (3,1) and δ * (1,3) . 17 The investment threshold for the leader is lower than for the follower, a consequence of the "eagerness of the leader" property of the race. When economic conditions improve to the point of inducing the leader to invest, the risk premium of the leader drops. This drop is a consequence of a pure progress effect: by successfully overcoming a hurdle, the firm is getting closer to winning the race and its riskiness decrease. In contrast, in the regions of cash flows where the leader is likely to further pull ahead in the race (δ * (3,1) < δ < δ * (1,3) ), the risk premium of the follower almost doubles as a consequence of preemption. This is exactly the opposite of a pure progress effect. The follower, falling behind in the race, is seeing its potential prize becoming more distant, causing higher risk premia. Once the economic conditions are sufficiently promising to induce the follower to also invest (i.e. δ > δ * (1,3) ), the risk premium of the follower will start to decrease and gradually converges to the value of the cash flow risk premium λ for sufficiently high levels of δ. Note finally, that the risk premium of the leader is affected by the decision of the follower to invest. In Figure 3 , in fact, the risk premium of the leader in state (3, 1), slightly increases for cash flow levels around the entry threshold of the follower.
[Insert Figure 3 approximately here]
In Figure 2 and 3 the level of risk premia for the competing firm is always higher than the risk premium λ for the derlying cash flow δ. Although preemption and technical uncertainty are idiosyncratic factors, they demand a risk premium in excess of the cash flow risk premium. This happens because, as Berk, Green, and Naik (2003) argue, the investment decisions of firms depends on systematic risk. If the option to invest/mothball is valuable, this dependence causes a premium in excess of the risk premium λ of the underlying cash flow. In the presence of competition, this premium is further amplified by the fact that the actions of the rival are also responding to systematic risk. The next proposition, a direct extension to the competitive case of the equivalent result in Berk, Green, and Naik (2003) , confirms this intuition by considering the case in which the option to mothball is worthless, i.e. firms do not face fixed costs. 18
17 The complete set of optimal investment triggers is reported in Panel A of Table II. 18 Without fixed costs it is immediate to see from the HJB system (6)-(7) that the value functions are linear in δ, the investment strategies are invariant to the level of cash flows and there is no option to mothball. When a = 0 the only thresholds are either δ * (n,m) = 0 (a firm always invests) or δ * (n,m) = ∞ (a firm never invests).
Proposition 5 In the absence of fixed costs, the (continuously compounded) risk premium demanded by a competing venture is constant and equal to λ.
It is natural to think of the investment opportunity as a compound option whose leverage is represented by the expected cost until completion. In Section 2.4, I showed that the risk premia of a competing venture is the product of the "Delta" of the investment option, ∂V /∂δ, the "Dividend-Price ratio", δ/V , and the risk premium of the underlying cash flow, λ. After a successful investment, (i) the delta of the option to rise, since leverage decreases and (ii) the value of the venture to increase, since it is more likely to succeed in the race.
Similarly, after preemption, both the the delta of the option and the value of the venture decrease. The numerical calibration of the model, as well as the analytical derivations in Section 3, show that the value effect dominates, causing the elasticity of the option to decrease after a successful investment and to increase after the successful investment of a rival.
In summary, by investing, a firm gains a chance to overcome a hurdle and, hence, of reducing the expected leverage of its investment option. However, if a firm remains idle while the opponent invests, its risk premia increase since the leverage of its investment option increase. As the numerical calibration shows, the magnitude of this effect can be quite substantial and cannot be ignored while estimating the cost of capital of an R&D venture.
Risk Premia and Competitive Pressure
From the solution of the two-stage game in Section 3, we might be tempted to think that for any given level of underlying cash flows, risk premia Λ(n, m) should be decreasing in n and increasing in m, suggesting that losing a stage to a rival increases the riskiness of the venture and that, all else equal, a venture is riskier the closer its opponent is. Analysis of risk premia across different degree of competitive pressure contradicts this intuition. To see this, consider Panel B in Figure 3 which reports the risk premia of a leading venture across two different competitive scenarios: in the first scenario, the leader, i.e., the firm which completed three stages, is facing a close rival (solid line, labeled Λ(3, 2)), in the second the leader is facing a more distant rival (dash-dotted line, labeled Λ(3, 1)). For value of the cash flows roughly between δ = 0.4 and δ = 0.8, the risk premium demanded by the venture with a close rival is lower than the risk premium demanded by the venture with a distant rival. This happens because, all else equal, the closer the rival, the lower the investment threshold of a leader (δ * (3,2) < δ * (3,1) ). By investing, the leader is increasing the chance of further pulling ahead in the race and this, from the analysis in the previous section, causes risk premia to decline. Hence, for low value of the underlying cash flow, the presence of a close competitor induces investment by a leader who would not have invested otherwise, thus reducing its risks premium. On the other side, when market conditions are good enough to induce the leader to invest even absent the fear of preemption, the presence of a close rival will naturally increase the chance of the leader to lose the race, increasing its risk premium. This is clearly seen in Panel B of Figure 3 for high level of cash flow.
In summary, these findings suggests that, to properly assess how the riskiness of a venture relates to the relative position during a race, it is crucial to condition also on the underlying potential profitability of firms. Competition has a double effect on riskiness. While a rival represent a "threat" of preemption in the completion of the race, on the other hand, its presence induces a leader to forego earlier its option to mothball. When this option is not valuable, i.e. when market conditions are sufficiently good, the first effect dominates and competition increases the risk premia of a firm leading the race. When market conditions are poor, the second effect dominates and competition decreases the leader's risk premia. A practical implication of this result is that, when estimating the cost of capital of an R&D firm engaged in a patent race, competition does not always demand a premium over the cost of capital of a non-competitive R&D venture.
Risk Premia and Industry Structure
The analysis so far has taken as given the competitive environment of the industry and addressed the question of how, in this context, competition affect the cost of capital of ventures engaged in R&D activity. A natural question that can be of interest to policymaker is how and to what extent the design of a competitive environment in which R&D is taking place may affect the overall value and cost of capital of an industry. This is only a part of a larger policy issue concerning the role of a government in disciplining R&D activity. 19 In this section we compare two legislative arrangement concerning R&D activity. In the first arrangement, R&D ventures are free to compete while in the second, firms are forced to collude. The main purpose of this analysis is to document how the specific competitive environment can affect the dynamics of the industry cost of capital. This quantity is not only relevant at a micro level for individual firms' decisions, as the previous sections showed, but is also a crucial determinant of aggregate R&D investment, macroeconomic growth and equity risk premia.
I model the collusive arrangement as a Research Joint Venture (RJV), defined as an agent who has at its disposal two research units, identical to the ones competing in R&D.
The problem faced by this agent is to optimally coordinate investments in those units in order to maximize the aggregate value. The RJV is a purely theoretical construct defining an idealized player who does not face preemption in the development process. Acting in the absence of strategic incentives, the investment policies-and consequently the values of the research units managed by the RJV-represent a non-competitive solution to the investment problem, comparable to the monopoly solution provided in Berk, Green, and Naik (2003) .
The cash flows and the technological structure across these two industry structures are otherwise identical.
Investment Strategies and Rent Dissipation
Using the same parameter values described in Table I , I solve for the equilibrium investment threshold of the RJV and compare them with the corresponding thresholds obtained earlier for the case of competition. The resulting strategies are reported in Table II. [Insert Table II approximately here] As it is evident from the table, the investment thresholds of competing R&D ventures are uniformly lower than the investment thresholds of the RJV, with the difference being more severe in early stages of development. This confirms a well-know result in the real option literature (see Grenadier (2002) ): the fear of preemption destroys the option value to wait.
To assess whether the excess spending in R&D induced by preemption affects industry value, I use as a measure of rent dissipation the difference between the industry value of the RJV and the combined value of the two competing firms. If preemption causes rent dissipation, the industry value in the competitive arrangement will be lower than the industry value in the collusive arrangement. Figure 4 reports rent dissipation as a percentage of the RJV value for different cash flow values. The magnitude of the option value destruction due to preemption is quite striking for low level of cash flows (Panel A and B) and almost disappears for at high levels of cash flow (Panel C and D). In general, rent dissipation tends to be at its highest when firms are neck-and-neck. These results are not surprising in light of the optimal investment strategies discussed in Table II . The investment thresholds of a competitive R&D venture differ the most from the investment threshold of a RJV precisely when firms are neck-and-neck (see the diagonal entry in Table II ). This is where we would expect the highest level of rent dissipation.
[Insert Figure 4 approximately here]
Dynamics of Risk Premia Across Industry Structures
What are the implication of the above results for the dynamic of the cost of capital across industry structures? An immediate way to address this question is to compute the risk premia for a RJV as discussed in section 2 and compare it with the corresponding risk premia earned by both ventures in a competitive environment. The comparison is reported in Figure 5 that relates the annual risk premia of a RJV venture in which one of the unit has completed two stages while the other has completed one stage (solid line) with the annual risk premia of a R&D venture which completed two stages (dashed line, leader) facing an opponent that has completed only one stage (dash-dotted line, follower).
[Insert Figuree 5 approximately here]
The dynamics of the risk premia across different industry structure obeys the same properties discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3. The leader has a lower investment threshold and the follower has a higher investment threshold than the RJV (δ * (2,1) < δ J * (2,1) < δ (1, 2) ). Therefore it is not surprising that in a competitive environment, a leader has a lower cost of capital, compared to a monopolist while the opposite is true for a follower.
An alternative way of addressing the implication of different competitive environment on the industry cost of capital is to simulate the underlying cash flow δ and analyze the effect of optimal firms behavior in different competitive scenarios on the evolution of risk premia.
Using the same parameter value as in Table I [Insert Figure 6 and Table III approximately here] For the benchmark case in which the volatility of the underlying cash flow is σ δ = 0.3, the mean completion time for a race is 13.3 years compared to 19.8 years for the case of a RJV.
The failure rate is 18.4% in the competitive industry and 39.2% in the collusive industry.
The average annual risk premium of a venture in a competitive industry is 4.084% compared to 3.487% for the case of a RJV. Comparing averages risk premia is somewhat misleading since this statistics aggregates the time series mean of risk premia across histories in which a venture is a leader and histories in which a venture is a follower. More informative is comparing the distribution of the mean risk premium across industry structures shown in Figure 6 . In the competitive case the distribution of mean risk premium shows a clear bimodal pattern with peaks at around 3.5% and 5%, with a maximum average risk premium of 8.091%. In the collusive industry the distribution is concentrated on the upper bound of 3.487%. 21 Finally, the mean of the annual volatility of risk premium is 190.01% in the competitive case, compared to 72.2% in the RJV case. Table III shows that completion time, failure rate, mean risk premia and volatility of risk premia are increasing in the volatility of underlying cash flows.
In concluding, the numerical calibration of this section suggests that, compared to an environment in which firms are forced to collude, allowing for competition in R&D causes rent dissipation, risk premia up to 500 annual basis point higher and volatility up to 3 times higher. On the other side, competition reduces dramatically the time it takes to bring innovation to the market and the failure rate of R&D activity within the industry. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the issue of whether high and more volatile risk 
A Appendix: Proofs for all Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1
If firm A completes first, then
and
Similarly for the case in which B completes first. 
Proof of Proposition
Let Γ ≡ (n, m). By (2) and (4), using Itô's Lemma, we can write Denoting by A is the Dynkin operator for the state variable δ, we obtain,
Let us take the optimal strategy u * B as given. Taking expectation with respect to the risk-neutral measure Q, we hence obtain:
where I used the fact that
the above equation to the definition in (17) when an optimal pair of strategies (u * A , u * B ) is played, it is immediate to obtain
which is the HJB equation (6). Similar steps can be followed to derive HJB equation (7). is non-decreasing in n, non-increasing in m, and tends to zero as δ goes to zero, i.e.,
Proof: Given the strategy of the opponent, the value of the R&D project is analogous to the price of a compound option written on the underlying cash flow δ and with exercise price equal to the investment cost. A firm which has completed n + 1 stages holds a compound option with a lower exercise price (i.e. lower expected cost to completion) than a firm that has completed n stages. Being such options of the call-type, (i) follows directly. To prove Proof: The result follows immediately from the HJB system (6)- (7) 
Proof: The proof follows immediately from the HJB system (6)- (7) and the structure of the optimal investment strategy in (8).
Proof of Proposition 3
Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q,
Given (1) and (18), the drift E P [dV ] under the true probability measure P is
From equation (19), using the value of the completed project obtained in Proposition 1,
which shows that λ is the risk premium for the completed project.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is by construction and involves solving the HJB system (6)- (7) 
The general solution is
The coefficients D (1,1) and W (1,1) , and the threshold δ * are obtained by imposing (i) Value matching, (ii) Smooth pasting and (iii) "Super high-contact" (i.e. matching of the second derivatives) at the threshold δ * :
Subgame (0,1). I search for an equilibrium satisfying the following two properties i. δ * A, (0,1) > δ * B, (0,1) , i.e., the leader in the race (B in this case) invests at a lower threshold than the follower. (1,1) , i.e., the closer A gets to completion, the lower its investment threshold is.
Using the boundary conditions for V A (0, 2) and V B (0, 2), Property (i) and (ii) reduce the original HJB system (6)- (7) 
The general solution (V A and V B ) for the above system (24)- (26) is
where 
,
where D (1, 1) , F (1,1) and G (1, 1) are the constants obtained in the solution of state (1, 1) and given in equations (22) and (20), respectively. This leaves 8 coefficients ( 
Finally, the two thresholds δ * A and δ * B are given implicitly by solving the following system of nonlinear equations
where all the coefficients has been derived above. 22
Subgame (1, 0) . Since the firms are identical, by exchangeability, we can use the results in state (0, 1) to infer the values and strategies in state (1, 0):
Subgame (0,0). The game is symmetric and so both player will play a symmetric strat- (0, 0) . Each firm's value function will have to satisfy the following system of o.d.e. (again, for simplicity, I use the shorthand notation V = V i (δ, 0, 0), and δ * = δ * i, (0, 0) , i = A, B). where V (δ, 1, 0) and V (δ, 0, 1) have been obtained in the previous step. To solve this system I need to conjecture what value for V (δ, 1, 0) and V (δ, 0, 1) is prevailing for δ > δ * (0, 0) . Since I showed that V (δ, 1, 0) and V (δ, 0, 1) depend on the equilibrium thresholds δ * i, (1, 0) , δ * i, (0, 1) , i = A, B, I need to make an assumption about the relationship between these thresholds and the current threshold δ * (0, 0) . I search for an equilibrium satisfying the following property:
iii. δ * (0,0) > δ * A, (0,1) and, similarly, δ * (0,0) > δ * B, (1,0) , i.e., firms at the beginning of the game wait longer to invest than firms facing a rival who is one stage ahead. 23 Imposing this Property and substituting the appropriate values for V (δ, 0, 1) in A, I obtain the following general solution
where, after matching coefficients
Value matching and smooth pasting deliver the following expressions for the coefficients D 1,(0,0) and W (0,0) (for simplicity I omit the index (0, 0) from the parameters): The super high-contact condition defines the optimal threshold δ * (0,0) implicitly as a solution of the following equation
Proof of Corollary 1
The proof follows directly by applying the definition of risk premia in (10) to the value derived in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
From the HJB system (6)- (7), it is immediate to see that, if a = 0, every solution is of the form V (δ, n, m) = Υ(n, m)δ, with Υ(n, m) a constant depending only on the state of the state. From the expression defining risk premia in (10),
B Appendix: Algorithm to solve for V (δ, n, m)
The numerical solution relies on an extended version of the value iteration algorithm used in standard dynamic programming problems (see Puterman (1994) and references therein).
I consider a discrete-time version of the process for the cash flows δ in (1) 
where The numerical solution for the RJV problem follows the same logic.
24 I also experimented with a variety of initial guesses for robustness. The figure reports the risk premia of an R&D venture facing an opponent which completed 2 stages. Risk premia are are expressed as percent per annum and plotted as a function of cash flows δ and of the number of stages n completed by the firm. The risk premium is defined as the difference between the continuously compounded expected return of the project and the riskless rate (see equation (10)). The R&D project requires 5 stages to be completed. Other parameter values are listed in Table I . The figure reports the annual percent risk premia as a function of underlying cash flows δ. In Panel A, the solid line refers to a firm which has completed three stages and faces an opponent which has completed only one stage. The dash-dotted line refers to a firm which has completed only one stage and faces an opponent which has completed three stages. In Panel B, the dash-dotted line refers to a firm which has completed three stages and faces a close opponent which has completed two stages while the solid line refers to a the same firm facing a more distant opponent which has completed only one stage. The vertical dotted lines labeled δ * (3,1) δ * (3,2) , δ * (2,3) and δ * (1,3) represent the optimal investment thresholds in the corresponding stages of the race. The horizontal dashed line in both panels is the risk premium λ demanded by a completed project. Parameter values are listed in Table I . The figure reports the percent value erosion induced by R&D competition ad different level of the underlying cash flow δ. The axis labeled "n" and "m refer to the stages completed by the two competing firms (race) or the phases completed by each research unit (RJV). Value erosion is calculated as the difference between the value of the RJV and of the sum of the values of the competing R&D firms, as a percentage of the RJV value. Parameter values are listed in Table I . Table I. 
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